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BUCKLEY V. VALEO: A LANDMARK OF POLITICAL FREEDOM 
 
by 
 
Joel M. Gora* 
 
It is appropriate for an article about the Supreme Court's Buckley 
opinion to appear in a law review in the Buckeye State.  In terms of poll 
rankings, the Buckeye football team finished last season ranked number two in 
the polls,1 which was much better than the Buckley decision, which many 
academics have put on their list of the ten worst decisions of this century.2  
While the football pollsters were right in ranking the Buckeyes so highly, the 
academic pundits are dead wrong in rating the Buckley decision so poorly.  
The Buckley decision, far from being a derelict ruling or a jurisprudential 
                                                 
*Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  Staff Counsel and Associate Legal Director, 
American Civil Liberties Union, 1969-1978.  Co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  I would like to express my appreciation for a Brooklyn Law 
School Summer Research Stipend grant for my work on this article. 
1Joe Drape, Mission Accomplished, If Sloppily, by the B.C.S., N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
1999, at D6. 
2 Cass R. Sunstein, Exchange; Speech in the Welfare State: Free Speech Now, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 255, 291 (1992);  Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986).  At best, Buckley gets compared with and criticized like the 
"discredited" Lochner doctrine which gave broad judicial protection to economic rights 
against police power regulation .   Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Worse 
still, some compare Buckley to the Court's disastrous decision upholding the 
"separate but equal" doctrine in race relations.   Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896).  Worst of all, some commentators have even compared Buckley to the Court's 
tragic ruling in the infamous Dred Scott case (Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 
(1857) which essentially upheld slavery and all but guaranteed the inevitability of the 
Civil War.   Scott Turow, The High Court's 20-Year-Old Mistake, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 
1997, Section 4, p. 15.  The Buckley decision, however, is not without its prominent 
academic defenders, many of whom feel that the Court's decision was basically 
sound, so far as it went, but that the Court should have been more rigorous in its 
scrutiny of the way in which limits on campaign funding limit political speech and 
association.   Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, 
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258 (1994); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political 
Money and Freedom of Speech, 30  U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997); Bradley Smith, 
Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1056 (1996); It also has strong defenders among 
nationally well-know First Amendment litigators.   Floyd Abrams, Look Who’s 
Trashing the First Amendment, COLUM.  JOURNALISM REV., November/December 
(1997).   
1
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outcast, is a landmark of political freedom, a ruling which carefully and 
conscientiously addressed the critical issues of campaign finance controls and 
free speech rights which still bedevil the nation today. Though not without 
considerable flaws, the decision stands as a beacon illuminating the view of 
First Amendment freedoms and political liberty that has informed Supreme 
Court jurisprudence for the second half of this century.  Compared to the limits-
driven repressive regime of government command and control of the political 
process embodied in the Federal Election Campaign Act, the vision of the 
Buckley opinion seeks to put as much control of the funding of the political 
process as possible in the hands of the people, not the government. 
 
A.  The core of the First Amendment 
 
Because of the efforts to demonize the Buckley ruling and the repeated 
rhetoric about how our campaign finance system is corrupting the country and 
undermining democracy, it is important to remember that campaign finance 
laws operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment concern: 
they regulate and restrain speech about government and politics.  In a ruling 
just four years ago, in a case arising in Ohio and involving regulation of 
campaign literature, the Court reminded us of the dangers when government 
attempts to regulate and control political speech, which, "as we have explained 
on many prior occasions . . . occupies the core of the protection afforded by 
the First Amendment . . . ."3  Quoting at length and with approval from  Buckley, 
the Court explained why this is so: 
 
Discussion of public issues and debate on the 
qualifications of candidates are integral to the 
operation of the system of government 
established by our Constitution.  The First 
Amendment affords the broadest protection to 
such political expression in order “to assure 
[the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people.”  Roth v. United  States, 
354 U.S. 476, 484(1957).  Although First 
Amendment protections are not confined to 
“the exposition of ideas,” Winters v. New York, 
333 U.S. 507 (1948), “there is practically 
universal agreement” that a major purpose of 
that Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs, . . . of 
                                                 
3McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995). 
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course including discussions of candidates . . . 
.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).  
This no more than reflects our “profound 
national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open,” New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  In a 
republic where the people are sovereign, the 
ability of the citizenry to make informed choices 
among candidates for office is essential, for the 
identities of those who are elected will 
inevitably shape the course that we follow as a 
nation.  As the Court observed in Monitor 
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971), “it 
can hardly be doubted that the constitutional 
guarantee has its fullest and most urgent 
application precisely to the conduct of 
campaigns for political office.”4 
 
That is why, the Court concluded, as it had in cases from Buckley on, 
that laws regulating and burdening "core political speech" like a 
campaign leaflet or the funding of political speech must be subject to 
the most "exacting scrutiny."5 
                                                 
4Id. at 346-347 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (1976)). 
5McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 380 (Scalia, J., dissent) and cases cited therein.  In a way, the 
Court's elegant constitutional language reflected its appreciation of an axiom of politics 
occasionally expressed somewhat less elegantly: "Money is the Mother's Milk of 
Politics."  Actually, my own first encounter with campaign finance issues came in 
1962 - well before my involvement in the Buckley case - as a college summer intern 
with the Democratic State Central Committee in my native Los Angeles, when I 
worked for the man who is widely-credited with having coined that phrase.  He was a 
well-known California politician named Jesse Unruh, who at the time was the powerful 
Democratic Speaker of the California State Assembly.  William Safire, Clone, Clone, 
Clone, Clone, N. Y. TIMES, April 6, 1997, Sec. 6, p. 18. He was a prodigious fund-
raiser and pioneered what we now call "Leadership PACs."  By centralizing fund-
raising for Democratic members of the State legislature, he was able to keep party 
cohesion which was instrumental in the passage of numerous prominent, progressive 
pieces of legislation, many of which bore his name.  He helped the liberal Governor 
Edmond G. "Pat" Brown gain an upset victory over former Vice-President Richard M. 
Nixon in the 1962 gubernatorial race.  As Curtis Gans frequently points out, much of 
the most important progressive legislation of the 20th century was passed during a 
time when politicians raised funds in a largely unregulated manner such as that. 143 
Cong. Rec. S. 10103, 10135 (1997).  
3
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My intern's job, however, was to organize the more grass-roots-oriented door-
to-door "Dollars for Democrats" campaign, which made me appreciate, even back 
then, that it is easier to raise campaign funds in large chunks than in small bites of 
one dollar at a time. 
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B.  The initial victims of campaign finance reform 
 
Even before Buckley, the civil liberties community and the courts began 
to encounter the difficulty of reconciling campaign finance controls with First 
Amendment rights.  The first significant case arose when three old-time 
dissenters came into the offices of the ACLU in the Spring of 1972, with what 
seemed an incredible story.  In late May of that year, they had sponsored a 
two-page ad in The New York Times advocating the impeachment of President 
Richard Nixon for bombing Cambodia and praising the handful of Members of 
Congress who had voted against the bombing.  The United States Justice 
Department hauled the group into federal court, demanded to know how they 
were organized and who had paid for the ad, threatened the group with 
injunctions for what they had done and told them they could not engage in 
further political speech of that nature unless they filed reports and disclosures 
with the government and otherwise complied with a wide variety of rules and 
regulations.6  This was all for sponsoring an advertisement publicly criticizing 
the President of the United States.   
 
Such a consequence seemed particularly paradoxical because this was 
a time when First Amendment case law had developed its most rigorous 
protection of citizen criticism of government officials and policies.7  How, in the 
face of that law, could the Government file a lawsuit to suppress that very same 
citizen criticism of government?   
 
                                                 
6 United States v. Nat’l. Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972); see 
generally, Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. Section 431, et seq. 
7See, e.g. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding protection of subversive 
or revolutionary advocacy of force and violence short of imminent and likely incitement 
thereof); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); (finding 
protection against prior restraint of "The Pentagon Papers" since government had not 
met its "heavy burden of justification" for such a restriction of public discussion); New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (granting press broad immunity to 
comment about politicians without fear of libel suits, in recognition of the "profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.") ; Mills v. 
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (finding “no test of reasonableness" can save a statute 
that makes it a crime for a newspaper to editorially endorse a political candidate on 
Election Day.); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding protection of even the 
most vulgar form of language used in public in a political setting). 
5
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The answer, of course, was campaign finance reform.  The government 
was suing under the brand new Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.8 The 
government's theory was that the two-page ad - even though it spoke solely 
about issues - mentioned, criticized or praised people who were candidates for 
election that year and that this might affect public opinion, which, in turn, might 
somehow  influence the outcome of the federal elections that year.  
Accordingly, this rendered this ad hoc group a "political committee," which had 
to file reports with the government and disclose their contributors and 
supporters, and, if they failed to do so, they would be enjoined from further 
political speech until they complied.   
 
In addition, to the extent that the advertisement could be interpreted as 
"on behalf of" those political figures who were praised and/or "in derogation of" 
those officials who were criticized, not only did such content render the group a 
regulatable political committee, but the Act and implementing regulations 
imposed new controls on the placement of such messages in the news media.  
The rationale of the provision was to enforce a new statutory ceiling on 
communication media expenditures by federal candidates.  But the effect of the 
rules was that newspapers, magazines, electronic broadcasters and virtually 
any other medium of mass communication could not even accept for 
publication such independent citizen political communication unless proper 
certifications had been provided by the candidates who benefitted from the 
message - either because they were praised or because their opponents were 
criticized.  For any news medium to run such advertisements without such 
proper certification - which as a practical matter would be impossible to obtain - 
would constitute a criminal offense by the news medium.  A harsher example of 
a system of prior restraint could hardly be imagined.9    
 
In one sense, though, the government was right.  Speech like that might 
influence people's opinion about Members of Congress, about incumbent 
politicians, about the President of the United States, and that, in turn, might 
influence their vote at the polls and, ultimately, the outcome of the election.  
And if one is serious about regulating the sources of  campaign funding, then 
                                                 
8The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431, et. seq.  Most of the 
more sweeping provisions that would be at issue in Buckley were passed three years 
later as the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.   
9 United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d. at 1142.  That separate 
provision, operating directly on the press, but restraining both the press and the 
independent speakers, was directly challenged and found facially unconstitutional in 
American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three-
judge court); vacated as moot, sub. nom.  Staats v. American Civil Liberties Union, 
422 U.S. 1030 (1975).  The New York Times supported the ACLU in that challenge to 
the media certification provision. 
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those "issue ads" cannot be allowed to slip by.  The anti-Nixon, impeachment 
advertisement cost $18,000.  Adjusted for inflation, that would be about 
$50,000 today.  That is serious money.  So if we are to be serious about 
controlling political funding, and limiting those who do "too much" of it, or 
"leveling the playing field," or guarding against people using money to "buy 
access and influence," then we better be prepared to face the prospect of 
going after people like the ad hoc impeachment group with injunctions and 
fines and maybe even criminal penalties for pooling their resources and 
speaking out on the public issues of the day and the public officials involved in 
those issues. 
 
And if all that has a familiar ring to it, and sounds, in the words of that 
great modern philosopher, Yogi Berra, "like deja vu all over again," it is 
because legislative proposals on the front burner today - most notably the 
McCain-Feingold bill in the United States Senate, and the Shays-Meehan bill 
which passed the House during the summer of 1998 - would achieve virtually 
the same kinds of controls on political speech that were at issue and rejected 
twenty-five years ago in the impeachment ad case.10 
                                                 
10The most recent version of the McCain-Feingold bill is § 26, The Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 1999.  See 145 Cong. Rec. § 396 (January 19, 1999). To give some 
flavor of how sweeping the multiple page bill is, here are excerpts from a press release 
issued from Senator McCain's office on the day the bill was introduced and describing 
key features of the bill.  With regard to "soft money": 
 
The central component of McCain-Feingold, this provision would 
prohibit all soft money contributions to the national political parties 
from corporations, labor unions and wealthy individuals.  In addition, 
state parties that are permitted under state law to accept these 
unregulated contributions would be prohibited from spending them on 
activities relating to federal elections such as voter registration within 
120 days of a federal election, get out the vote campaigns, and 
campaign advertising that mentions a federal candidate.  In addition, 
federal candidates would be prohibited from raising soft money in 
connection with a federal election.  The bill also prohibits the parties 
from raising money for or transferring money to tax-exempt 
organizations. 
Id.  
With regard to "issue advocacy:" 
The Snowe-Jeffords amendment, adopted as part of McCain-Feingold 
during the Senate's February 1998 campaign finance debate, 
address the explosion of thinly-veiled campaign advertising funded by 
corporate and union treasuries.  These ads skirt federal election law 
by avoiding the use of direct entreaties to "vote for" or "vote against" 
a particular candidate.  The amendment defines a new category of 
7
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That impeachment advertisement case was a wake-up call to the 
ferocious First Amendment problems that campaign finance laws could pose.  
Now, 25 years later, the issues of money, politics, free speech, and, indeed, 
democracy itself, remain very much the same.   
 
But that is getting a little bit ahead of the story.    
 
In the impeachment ad case, in 1972, the court ruled that campaign 
finance laws could not be used against non-partisan, issue-oriented groups 
engaged in public commentary about the political issues of the day and the 
public officials involved in those issues.  Another prominent court came to a 
similar conclusion one year later and invalidated the application of the relevant 
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act to groups like the ACLU 
whose "major purpose" was the discussion of public issues, not the election of 
political candidates.11 
                                                                                                                         
'electioneering communications' that refer to a clearly identified 
candidate or candidates; appear within 30 days of a primary or 60 
days of a general election; and are broadcast on TV (including cable 
or satellite) or radio to the candidate's electorate.  This definition 
would NOT include any printed communication, direct mail, voter 
guides, or the Internet.  The amendment prohibits unions and for-
profit corporations from directly or indirectly making electioneering 
communications using treasury funds.  Only voluntarily contributed 
PAC money could be used for these types of communications.  The 
amendment permits 501(c)(4) non-profit corporations to make 
electioneering communications as long [as] they use only individual 
contributions (not corporate or union funds) and make certain 
disclosures.  The amendment prevents unions or corporations from 
laundering funds through non-profits to make electioneering 
communications.  The amendment provides for disclosure by groups 
making electioneering communications that total $10,000 or more in 
an election cycle.  The group must disclose its identity, the cost of 
the communication, and the names and addresses of all contributors 
of $500 or more to the sponsor of the communication within the 
cycle....The amendment makes clear that electioneering 
communications that are coordinated with a federal candidate or a 
political party committee are contributions to that candidate or party 
committee. 
Id. 
Although the bill exempts print media messages, it otherwise would reach precisely 
the kind of message contained in the impeachment ad case. 
11 United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (1972); American 
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C.  Campaign Finance Reform Run Riot 
 
Within a year, we had Watergate revelations of campaign funding 
excesses, and even though much of that occurred before effective disclosure 
went into effect, Congress was stampeded into enacting the sweeping 1974 
restrictions on political activity that would give rise to the constitutional 
challenge in Buckley v. Valeo.  In an atmosphere filled with the same kind of 
rhetoric that we hear today about how money is corrupting politics and 
destroying democracy, Congress passed a law that was the archetype of 
government control of political funding and therefore of political speech, 
association and communication.  And that meant government control, 
ultimately, of democracy itself, because, as the Supreme Court has told us time 
and again, freedom of political speech is the engine of democracy: "speech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government."12 
 
That law13 severely restricted candidates, campaigns, contributors, 
independent political groups, and even non-partisan issue groups like the 
ACLU, who had just been assured by the courts that their advocacy would be 
free of official restraint. And enforcement of those new restrictions was placed 
in the hands of a commission completely dominated and controlled by the 
House and Senate - a cynical breach of traditional separation of powers 
principles that the Buckley Court would soon declare invalid.14  
                                                                                                                         
Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D. D. C. 1973)  The validity of the 
"major purpose" test, as a constitutionally-required or statutorily-based limiting gloss 
on the applicability of the federal election campaign laws to non-partisan groups was 
before the Court more recently in FEC v. Akins , 524 U.S. 11 (1998), but the Court did 
not reach or decide the issue. 
12Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). 
13That law, the Federal Election of 1971, Public Law 92-255, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, et. 
seq.[herinafter  ‘71 Act], was amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments of 1974, PUB. L. NO. 93-443;  supra note 8. 
14Indeed, the portion of Buckley which unanimously invalidated the manner in which 
members of the Federal Election Commission were appointed because of the 
substantial powers they were given set the tone for two decades of Supreme Court 
rulings finding that various corner-cutting government mechanisms that Congress had 
established in ways that departed from the specific design of the Constitution's 
separation and balance of powers were unconstitutional.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 143 (1976); see also Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50 (1982); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714 (1986); Clinton v. New York, 118 S. Ct. 1551 (1998).  The only major statute 
9
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(1) The Act severely restricted a candidate's overall campaign expenditures, 
even if the funding all came from small contributions.  Even many Buckley 
critics might concede that the spending limits in the Act were unconscionably 
low and incumbent-protective.15  The spending limit for House races was 
$70,000, an extremely low figure even by 1974 standards, and an amount less 
than the amount that each House members spent on the average on the free 
mail frank and constituent services. 
 
(2) The Act severely limited the amount of money candidates could contribute 
to their own campaigns, even though candidates could not possibly corrupt 
themselves.  Had they used their money to run for the White House, Ross 
Perot and Steve Forbes would have wound up in the Big House.   
 
(3) Perhaps even worse, independent speakers were all but completely 
silenced by the new law which placed a ceiling of $1,000 on how much any 
person could spend on what we now call "independent expenditures."  That 
was about the cost of a one-quarter page ad in The New York Times, criticizing 
or praising the President of the United States.  Spend a dime more on political 
speech and your free speech would become a felony.  What a breathtaking 
and extraordinary restriction.  This unprecedented  provision was justified as a 
"loophole-closing device" which would prevent political supporters who could no 
longer make large contributions directly to candidates from making large 
independent expenditures instead.  Of course, the loophole being closed was 
essentially the First Amendment itself and its guarantee of no Congressional 
abridgements of "the freedom of speech."  Only Justice Byron White would 
have sustained this remarkable provision.  Today, $1,000 would barely buy a 
tombstone ad on the front page of The New York Times.  Had this provision 
been sustained and unchanged, it would effectively have eliminated the use of 
editorial advertisements by citizens to criticize incumbent officials and political 
candidates. 
 
                                                                                                                         
upheld against a separation of powers challenge was one of the other great post-
Watergate "reforms" which would cure corruption and unaccountable power forever, 
namely, the Independent Counsel Act.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
15 Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution: A Critical Look at Buckley v. 
Valeo, 1997: Hearings on Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform Before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 105th Congress 
(1997) (statement by Burt Neuborne, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law at New 
York University and Legal Director of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 
(1994). 
10
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(4) Make the smallest of campaign donations and you would get your name 
and political affiliation publicly disclosed or kept on file with the government.16  
Even controversial, minor and third parties that the government spent a lot of 
time and money spying on, would have to disclose their most modest 
contributors, although that might subject such individuals to harassment and 
retaliation.17 
 
(5) All the issue-oriented groups that report and comment on the records of 
incumbents up for re-election would likewise have to file reports with the 
government disclosing their contributors and supporters.  Indeed, the sweeping 
reforms included one provision specifically targeted on issue advocacy groups 
that rate and provide "box scores" about how members of Congress vote on 
issues of concern to the individual groups.18 Challenged along with the other 
                                                 
16The ‘71 Act required covered political committees and organizations to disclose the 
names and addresses of all individuals who contributed more than $100 and to keep 
on file the names and address of all individuals who contributed as little as $11. 
Federal Election of 1971, Public Law 92-255, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, et. seq. 
17In Buckley, though sustaining the disclosure provisions on their face, the Court did 
indicate that where controversial political parties or groups could make a credible 
showing that disclosure would lead to harassment and disruption, they might be 
constitutionally immune from compliance with campaign reporting and disclosure 
rules.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.  That principle would be applied six years later to hold 
that campaign committees formed  by parties like the Socialist Workers' Party would 
be immune from effective disclosure.   Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign 
Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982). 
18That section was § 437a of the Act, 2 U.S.C. codified at § 437 (a).  Its rather clumsy 
language provided as follows:   
Any person (other than an individual) who expends any funds or 
commits any act directed to the public for the purpose of influencing 
the outcome of an election, or who publishes or broadcasts to the 
public any material referring to a candidate (by name, description, or 
other reference) advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, 
setting forth the candidate's position on any public issue, his voting 
record, or other official acts (in the case of a candidate who holds or 
has held Federal office), or otherwise designed to influence 
individuals to cast their votes for or against such candidate or to 
withhold their votes from such candidate shall file reports with the 
Commission as if such person were a political committee. The 
reports filed by such person shall set forth the source of the funds 
used in carrying out any activity described in the preceding sentence 
in the same detail as if the funds were contributions within the 
meaning of section 431(e) of this title, and payments of such funds in 
11
Gora: Buckley v. Valeo
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
 
key provisions of the Act, that section was unanimously declared 
unconstitutional by a D.C. Circuit which was enthralled by every other 
significant feature of the law.  Only that section drew the complete 
condemnation of judges spanning the ideological spectrum from Bazelon and 
Wright to Tamm and Wilkey.  The en banc D.C. Circuit unanimously ruled the 
provision defectively vague and overbroad for seeking to regulate core and 
vital issue speech unconnected to the specific cause of any candidate.19  It was 
an impermissible restriction of citizen and organizational speech about 
important public issues.  The Government did not take an appeal from that 
ruling and the section was allowed to die, only to see attempts at resurrection 
in recent years.20 
                                                                                                                         
the same detail as if they were expenditures within the meaning of 
section 431(f) of this title. The provisions of this section do not apply 
to any publication or broadcast of the United States Government or 
to any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the 
facilities of a broadcasting station or a bona fide newspaper, 
magazine, or other periodical publication. 
Id. 
19Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 843-44 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(en banc). 
20It has not gone remarked sufficiently that key elements of the various bills like 
McCain-Feingold or Shays-Meehan seek to regulate issue advocacy in language 
virtually indistinguishable from § 437a which was roundly and conclusively condemned 
as unconstitutional in Buckley.  They are virtually reincarnations of that flawed and 
condemned provision.  As one commentator recently put it: 
Section 437a has the distinction of being the only section of the 
post- Watergate reforms struck down by what, at the time, was the 
most liberal pro- campaign finance regulation court in the country. 
Even to that naturally sympathetic court, Section 437a was beyond 
the constitutional pale. In fact, the section was so indefensible that 
its overturning was not appealed to the Supreme Court by any of its 
defenders, including the Department of Justice, the FEC, or their 
allied reform groups (including Common Cause). Even though the 
question was not presented directly, the Supreme Court's 1976 
decision in Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, firmly enunciated the principles that 
led the D.C. Circuit to strike down Section 437a. The Supreme Court 
noted that: The distinction between discussion of issues and 
candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may 
often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially 
incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative 
proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates 
campaign on the basis of their positions on various public issues, 
but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court set forth in Buckley the holding, 
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But otherwise, the lower court upheld the major features of the new act. 
 How could this sweeping monitoring and control of political speech and activity 
possibly be called "reform?"   Especially since as breathtaking as the law was in 
terms of the political activity it sought to control, it was no less cynical in what it 
exempted from those controls.  The most outrageous exemption was for the 
costs of free franked mail, which by itself, gave incumbent House Members 
more money to spend on political communication with their constituents than 
the whole amount that a challenger was allowed to spend on his or her entire 
campaign under the new spending limits.21  How is that creating a level playing 
field for incumbents? 
 
To groups like the ACLU, these did not seem to be genuine reforms 
that would expand political participation and opportunity.  Rather, they seemed 
more to be an unprecedented Incumbent Protection Act.  They would suppress 
the individual and group political advocacy which is at "the core of our electoral 
process and of the First Amendment freedoms"22 and which is the very engine 
of democracy.  That is why House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt could not 
have been more wrong when he insisted that:  "What we have is two important 
values in direct conflict:  freedom of speech and our desire for healthy 
campaigns in a healthy democracy . . . . You can't have both."23 In fact, and in 
law, there cannot be one without the other. 
 
 
D.  The Triumph of Reason 
 
That was the statutory scheme that the Court had before it in Buckley, 
which has been severely criticized and even demonized.24  While certainly not 
                                                                                                                         
which is valid to this day, that only speech expressly advocating the 
election or defeat of clearly identified candidates may be subjected to 
certain forms of regulation, including compulsory disclosure to the 
government.  
Jan Witold Baran, The Reform That Cannot and Should Not Ever Happen, LEGAL 
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1998, at S.36. That court ruling calls into severe question many of the 
proposals today to control issue group spending and thereby speaking. 
21 Supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
22Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 
(1968)) (emphasis added). 
23Nancy Gibbs, The Wake-Up Call: Clinton Makes Serious Noises About Campaign 
Reform, But That May Not Be Enough To Change A Cozy System That Loves Special-
Interest Money, TIME, Feb. 3, 1997, at p. 22. 
24 Supra note 2. 
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without its flaws, the decision, properly considered, is a landmark of political 
freedom.25  The Court correctly recognized that limitations on political funding 
are limitations on political speech and thereby threatened well-established 
principles at the core of the First Amendment's protection.   
 
To the argument that money is not speech, the Court quite sensibly 
responded that limitations on how much one could spend to speak were 
limitations on how much one could speak.  Whether the subject is funding for 
political speech or funding for the arts or funding for abortion counseling or 
funding for legal services programs - or funding for campaign finance reform 
advocacy - there is an obvious and inextricable link between restrictions on 
funding and restrictions on speech, and the Buckley Court soundly recognized 
that:  "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on 
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of 
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their 
exploration, and the size of the audience reached."26  Indeed, in cases both 
before and after Buckley, the Court has consistently understood that efforts to 
restrain the funding of speech are tantamount to efforts to restrain the speech 
                                                 
25For a particularly powerful and relatively contemporary paean to the wisdom of the 
Buckley decision, see Scot Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment,  
1982 SUP. CT. REV. 243 (1982). 
26One of the abiding ironies of the campaign finance reform debate is that so many 
who attack the Court for "equating" money with speech haven’t the slightest hesitation 
to use their own, often unlimited resources to argue that money is not speech. 
Presumably the unimaginably wealthy proponents of controlling campaign funding have 
no embarrassment about using their own extraordinary resources to communicate that 
message.  Either they fail to see the irony or prefer the adage of fighting fire with fire.  
Groups urging efforts to take private money out of politics have no hesitation to take 
millions of dollars of private money to put forth their message.  See Dierdre 
Shesgreen, But Proliferation of Groups Doesn’t Spur Progress in Curbing Political 
Cash, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at p. 1.  One article observed that George Soros, 
the billionaire philanthropist, gave $3,000,000 to Public Campaign, a group which 
argues that the wealthy have too much influence over our public life.  See Greg Pierce, 
Double Standard, WASH.  TIMES, June 18, 1997, p. A10.  The billionaire financier, 
Jerome Kohlberg, supports a campaign finance reform organization which spent 
$400,000 to try to defeat a Senate candidate whose politics he did not like.  See Ruth 
Marcus, The Advocates Pipe Down the Ads, WASH. POST , October 23, 1998 , p. A10. 
 Of course, the most chronic examples of irony are the multimillionaire owners of the 
nation’s newspapers, most of whom editorially and passionately support funding 
controls on others, while using their own extensive wealth to fund their newspapers 
and magazines to make that point.  See Ira Glasser, Campaign “Reform” Limits 
Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, p. A. 24. 
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itself and has applied the Buckley principles to invalidate such schemes.27  
Such rulings were particularly appropriate since the restrictions in Buckley and 
similar cases were on the use of private funds and resources to communicate 
private political messages, not on the use of public funds to facilitate those 
messages.28 
 
To the claim, relentlessly repeated today, that there is "too much" 
campaign spending and that it must be controlled by government, the Court 
responded that the First Amendment fundamentally denies government the 
right to make that choice:   
The First Amendment denies government the 
power to determine that spending to promote 
one’s political views is wasteful, excessive, or 
unwise.  In the free society ordained by our 
Constitution, it is not the government but the 
people -- individually as citizens and 
candidates and collectively as associations and 
political committees - who must retain control 
over the quantity and range of debate on 
public issues in a political campaign.29 
                                                 
27The cases before Buckley include New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964) (holding the fact that political advertisement is paid for does not justify depriving 
it of First Amendment protection); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (finding the 
fact that abortion services advertisement is paid for does not justifying withdrawing 
First Amendment protection).  Since Buckley, the Court has applied its principle 
numerous times to invalidate statutes and rules which attempted to restrain speech by 
restraining the funding of that speech.  See, e.g. Buckley v. American Constitutional 
Law Foundation, 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999) (invalidating, inter alia, rule that paid petition-
signature collectors had to disclose sources of funding); United States v. National 
Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (invalidating rule that federal 
employees could not be paid honorariums for giving speeches or writing articles while 
off-duty); Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims 
Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (invalidating rule that prevented criminals from receiving 
money for writing or speaking about his or her crime); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 
(1988) (invalidating rule that prohibited paying people to circulate petitions to get 
signatures to put a voter initiative on the ballot).   
28In the more complex area of government efforts to control the speech uses of public 
funds, the Court has also recognized the important link between money and speech, 
but has been far too willing to let the government use its power of the purse to control 
the speech of those it patronizes.  The issues were addressed most prominently by 
the Court in National Endowment v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), which upheld certain 
vague government restraints on governmentally funded art subsidized by the NEA. 
29Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).   
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Who would quarrel with that principle? 
 
To the claim that the free speech of those with more  resources could 
be restrained in order to enhance the political opportunity of those with less 
resources - a kind of First Amendment Lowest Common Denominator, a 
principle for leveling down freedom of speech - the Court responded: 
 
The concept that government may restrict the 
speech of some elements of our society in 
order to enhance the relative voice of others is 
wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which 
was designed to secure the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered 
exchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and societal changes desired by the 
people.30 
 
That too embodies settled doctrine.  Buckley critics often stress the first part of 
this quote, to create the impression that the decision is some kind of royalist 
ruling, while underplaying the second portion of the quote which makes it clear 
that the evil of restricting some speakers is the consequent restraint on public 
discussion and the instrumental role of freedom of speech and press.   
 
Finally, in answering the claim that issue-oriented speech about 
incumbent politicians must be regulated because it might influence public 
opinion and thereby affect the outcome of elections, the Court, with great force, 
reminded us of the critical relationship between unfettered issue advocacy and 
healthy democracy.  "Discussion of public issues and debate on the 
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of 
government established by our Constitution."31 And with equal clarity, the Court 
observed that in an election season one cannot abstractly discuss issues 
without discussing the candidates and their stands on those issues. 
 
The distinction between discussion of issues 
and candidates and advocacy of election or 
defeat of candidates may often dissolve in 
practical application.  Candidates, especially 
incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues 
involving legislative proposals and 
governmental actions.  Not only do candidates 
                                                 
30Buckley,  424 U.S. at 48-49 (emphasis added).  
31424 U.S. at 14. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
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campaign on the basis of their positions on 
various public issues, but campaigns 
themselves generate issues of public interest.32 
 
If any reference to a candidate in the context of advocacy on an issue 
rendered the speaker or the speech subject to campaign finance controls, the 
consequences for First Amendment rights would be intolerable.33 
 
Accordingly, in order to protect First Amendment rights, the Court 
fashioned the critical "express advocacy" requirement, which holds that only 
the funding of express advocacy of electoral outcomes may be subject to 
restraint.  All speech which does not in express terms advocate the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate must remain totally free of any 
regulation:  "So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in 
express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, 
they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his 
views."34  The Court thus reaffirmed two principles which are critical to today's 
debate over campaign finance regulation:  1) The area in which campaign 
finance controls may operate has to be narrowly and carefully and clearly 
defined; and,  2) Outside of such area of permissible regulation, no, to repeat, 
no controls are allowable.  These principles, which seem almost self-evident, 
                                                 
32Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.   
33For example: 
[W]hether words intended and designed to fall short 
of invitation would miss that mark is a question both 
of intent and of effect. No speaker, in such 
circumstances, safely could assume that anything 
he might say upon the general subject would not be 
understood by some as an invitation. In short, the 
supposedly clear-cut distinction between 
discussion, laudation, general advocacy, and 
solicitation puts the speaker in these 
circumstances wholly at the mercy of the varied 
understanding of his hearers and consequently of 
whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent 
and meaning.  Such a distinction offers no security 
for free discussion. In these conditions it blankets 
with uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels 
the speaker to hedge and trim.   
Id. at 43 (quoting  Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)). 
34424 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added). 
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are nonetheless once again threatened by legislative proposals like McCain-
Feingold and Shays-Meehan pending in Washington and in many States.35 
 
E.  Compromise Controls    
 
Those portions of Buckley which struck limits on campaign funding 
vindicated core First Amendment rights in ways that justify praise and certainly 
do not merit the condemnation that Buckley routinely receives.  But other parts 
of the Court's decision bear the hallmark of judicial compromise and have 
created a regime of partial regulation which has become the epitome of 
unintended and undesirable consequences.   
 
First, while striking down limits on expenditures by candidates, political 
committees or individuals, the Court reversed field and upheld limits on 
contributions by individuals to political candidates and campaign committees.  
The Court did so because of its sense that restraints on contributions were less 
severe than those on expenditures, while more directly implicating concerns 
with the actual or potential or apparent corrupting effect of "large" contributions 
on political candidates who are and/or will become public officials.  Though 
noting that the "Act's contributions and expenditure limitations operate in an 
area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities,"36 the Court 
nonetheless concluded that limits on campaign contributions are somehow 
"lesser" restraints because contributions are one step removed from speech 
compared to expenditures, the amount of a contribution does not add 
appreciably to the message of support it embodies and contributors are free to 
spend unlimited amounts to promote their chosen candidate or cause directly 
and independently.37  With respect to corruption, the Court stated that: 
 
It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's 
primary purpose - to limit the actuality and 
appearance of corruption resulting from large 
individual financial contributions - in order to 
find a constitutionally sufficient justification for 
the $1,000 contribution limitation.  [T]o the 
extent that large contributions are given to 
secure political quid pro quos from current and 
potential officeholders, the integrity of our 
                                                 
35Supra note 7. 
36Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,14 (1976). 
37Id. at 35. 
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system of representative democracy is 
undermined.38 
 
The Court's upholding of contribution limits gave insufficient weight to a 
number of critical arguments pressed by the challengers.  First, a restraint on 
contributions would become a defacto restraint on expenditures, especially for 
those candidates who are not well-connected or well-heeled.  The primary 
beneficiaries of the upholding of contribution limits have been personally 
wealthy candidates who do not need the kindness of strangers and incumbents 
who have more than enough "friends" or groups of friends, i.e. PACs, to help 
fund them.  That is one reason why incumbency rates have remained extremely 
high.   
 
Second, unless adjusted for inflation - which they have not been - those 
contribution limits make it harder and harder for candidates, especially 
challengers, to raise funds to get their message out.  Indeed, a number of 
lower courts have recently invalidated "reform" enactments that lowered 
contributions limits to levels as low as $250 or even $100, reasoning that such 
Draconian restraints made it all but impossible for non-wealthy candidates to 
raise funds for their campaigns.39  Some courts have even held that a $1,000 
contribution limit - the exact amount sustained in Buckley, but equivalent today 
to a $320 ceiling in 1976 terms - failed to survive strict scrutiny where it was set 
at such a low level - in effect $320 in 1976 dollars - that it bore no rational 
relationship to deterring corruption, especially where the limits were put into 
place in the absence of any record of corruption remotely comparable to that 
presented in Buckley.  Indeed, the Court has granted review in one of those 
cases, placing on the table the question of how relatively low contribution limits 
can be sustained 25 years after Buckley.40 
                                                 
38Id. at 27.   
39National Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia Board of Election and Ethics, 924 
F Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1996) vacated as moot, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1997), aff’d, 168 
F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1999); California Profile Council PAC v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 
1295 (E.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 164 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999).  But see: Kentucky Right to 
Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d  637, 645-651 (6th Cir. 1997). 
40The case is Shrink Missouri PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. 
granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999), where the lower court invalidated contribution limits of 
$250 for state assembly, $500 for state Senate and $1,000 for statewide office.  The 
Court denied certiorari in two cases from Ohio directly challenging Buckley=s ruling 
that you cannot have expenditure limits.  Those two cases would have permitted the 
Court directly to consider the validity of Buckley’s disallowence of expenditure limits.   
Kruse v. City of Cincinnatti, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998) cert. denied,  119 S. Ct. 511 
(1998) (striking a Cincinnati ordinance which limited expenditures in City Council races 
and which was intended to be a test case of Buckley); Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 
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Third, the challengers claimed that the tight controls over contributions 
would cause campaign funding to flow to areas of political communication which 
were not subject to those restraints, most notably, issue advocacy and political 
party activity funded by "soft money," which is funding precisely not limited to 
$1,000 from individuals.  The Court seemed unmoved by these concerns.  But 
the phenomena of issue advocacy and soft money - and proposals to control 
both - have dominated campaign finance debate and proposals in recent 
years.    
 
Moreover, the Court gave insufficient attention to the argument that 
there were less drastic alternatives to deal with the actuality and potential of 
corruption than the problematic use of contribution limits.  The major 
suggestion was the use of effective disclosure of large contributions to 
candidates and campaign committees so that the public would have the means 
to ferret out whatever undue access and influence might possibly  be accorded 
to campaign contributors.  But the Court concluded that full disclosure, coupled 
with laws against bribery and conflict of interest and the activities of a vigorous 
free press, was an insufficient inoculation or antidote to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.41  
 
Finally, the Court also sustained a scheme of public funding for 
Presidential candidates.  That, too, has been a mixed blessing.  Of course, 
                                                                                                                         
523, 528-533 (6th Cir. 1998), cert.denied 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999) (invalidating campaign 
expenditure limits for judicial elections). 
41Often overlooked in the debates about Buckley is the fact that the Court also upheld 
against constitutional challenge the Act's sweeping and overbroad disclosure 
requirements.  As indicated above, campaign contributors of as little as $101 dollars - 
equivalent to $32  today - would have to be automatically publicly disclosed.  
Contributors who gave as little as $11 - about $3.50 today - would have their names 
stored for supplying to the government upon demand.   While the challengers argued 
that disclosure was a less drastic and more democratic remedy to the concerns with 
corruption and undue access and influence, the argument was limited to "large" 
contributions to mainline candidates and parties where there was a real impact.  
Instead, the Court, though acknowledging that compelled disclosure can substantially 
interfere with freedom of association, sustained the wide-sweeping disclosure that 
invades an extremely broad area of political privacy without any sufficient justification. 
The Court felt that the low disclosure levels were reasonable attempts to detect 
patterns of giving and to discourage violations of the contribution limits. Though the 
Court did show some sensitivity to the plight of controversial minor parties, which 
would lead to a later ruling that such groups did not have to disclose their contributors 
and supporters, See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 
87 (1982) the Court nonetheless upheld the facial validity of the disclosure rules. 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss1/2
1999]   BUCKLEY V. VALEO                           
 
public funding can be an important antidote to the concerns with corruption 
from private contributions, and the proper kind of public funding can expand 
the spectrum of political participation and opportunity in a very meaningful way. 
 The Court recognized that potential, but the scheme it upheld contained two 
serious flaws.   
 
First, the funding arrangement is basically designed to benefit the two 
major political parties and their candidates, with a premium on past electoral 
success as a measure of current public benefit.  Minor parties and new 
candidates basically need not apply for pre-election funding.  The Court 
sustained this scheme against an Equal Protection challenge.  Second, the 
funding arrangement requires eligible candidates to limit their overall and state-
by-state expenditures in order to get primary matching funds.  In order to get 
general election funds, presidential candidates have to agree not to raise or 
spend even $1.00 of private money.   
 
That stipulation, in turn, has had two consequences.  First, it has 
legitimized, without serious consideration, a form of "unconstitutional 
conditions" whereby candidates must give up all rights to raise and spend 
private funds in order to receive public campaign funds.  This has guaranteed 
that almost all public funding proposals pressed at the federal level and 
enacted at the state and local level will have strings attached and, in all 
likelihood, will benefit incumbents over challengers because the arrangements 
are limits-driven.42 
 
Second, and most notably, the conditioned limits on public funding have 
led inexorably to the soft money phenomenon and to the rise of “soft money” 
and multi- million dollar party “issue campaigns” run to skirt those limits.  
 
F.  Lessons for the Future 
 
If there is any lesson we should have learned from 25 years of 
campaign finance controls, it is that limits on campaign funding, apart from 
constitutional questions, have an equally critical flaw: they just do not work.   
 
Trying to equalize political opportunity and influence through limiting 
political speech and association is a futile task.  Limit the funding of the 
candidates equally, and the advantage of incumbency or celebrity will disturb 
the equilibrium, as will the presence of powerful outside voices, independent 
                                                 
42Kathleen M. Sullivan, Reply: Political Money and Freedom of Speech: A Reply to 
Frank Askin, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1083 (1998); See also Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 
940 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding triggered public funding.) 
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political groups, labor unions, issue groups and the news media.43  Limit 
wealthy contributors from giving money to candidates, and they will still be able 
to buy newspapers, fund issue groups and give large amounts of "soft money" 
to get their message out in ways that the average person can never hope to 
equal.  The ability of a George Soros or a Rupert Murdock to use their vast 
funds to influence the debate on political candidates and public issues for 
example, campaign finance reform - is limitless compared to the average 
citizen.  Attempt to limit all those voices and methods of influencing the 
electorate, on the claim that they are "buying elections" or "drowning out the 
voice of the people" and you have a First Amendment meltdown.44 
 
Far better to deal with such disparities by encouraging average people 
to band together in groups to support issues and candidates that appeal to 
them to counter the wealthy few.  That is what freedom of speech and 
association are all about. 
 
The 1974 law limited individual contributions to House and Senate 
candidates, and we have witnessed a proliferation of PACs, and independent 
groups and issue advocacy.  Challengers have a hard time raising money and 
incumbents are more insulated against effective challenge.  Things are easy 
only for the well-heeled or the well-connected.   
 
                                                 
43Michael Janofsky, Gore Building Network in California, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, 
Section 1, Page 24.  See also Bernard Weinraub, Hollywood Raises Curtain on 2000, 
N.Y. TIMES, February 20, 1999, A8 (noting that both Democratic and Republican 
Presidential hopefuls “troop in almost every week to gather support from the rich and 
super-rich” among the Hollywood and entertainment industry moguls.) Compare the 
remark in Buckley that public financing of presidential elections would be “a means of 
eliminating the improper influence of large private contributions . . . .”  Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 96.  
44Some scholars think that controls on wealthy media owners or other speakers in the 
service of campaign finance reform and equalization would justify restraints on such 
publishers.  See Richard Hasen Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch 
Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1999) (arguing that it would be permissible to cover 
media under campaign finance laws, especially if the equality of political opportunity 
theme rejected in Buckley were adopted by the Court.  See also,  Richard L. Hasen, 
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign 
Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Scott E. Thomas, Corporate Funds: Use 
in Campaign Banned, WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 12, 1999, at A15 (Letter to Wall 
Street Journal from Scott Thomas, Commissioner of the FEC, justifying the proceeding 
(later dropped) against Steve Forbes for that portion of his monthly magazine column 
deemed partisan and not issue-oriented).  Normal First Amendment instincts are 
fundamentally averse to such government micro management of media and politics. 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss1/2
1999]   BUCKLEY V. VALEO                           
 
The law sharply limited contributions to Presidential candidates, and we 
have seen the splurge of soft money funding that has gone on for almost 20 
years.  The highly structured system of public financing of Presidential 
elections, hailed as a model of reform, has become the poster child of the 
failure of limits-driven public campaign funding controls.  Political parties have 
spent millions of dollars on "image ads" to influence public opinion in ways  
favorable to their party or candidate.  Make no mistake, the millions of dollars 
spent by the Democratic Party on such ads effectively decided the outcome of 
the 1996 Presidential campaign in favor of President Clinton before that 
campaign had even officially begun.  
 
The Court's split decision in Buckley has helped create the campaign 
finance dilemma we have had ever since.  Wealthy candidates can spend 
unlimited funds on campaigns, while less wealthy candidates are severely 
limited in trying to raise funds from others to get their message out.  
Incumbents have built-in fund-raising advantages, while non-wealthy 
challengers must scramble for funds.  People or organizations who want to give 
financial support directly to candidates and parties are restrained from doing 
so, but permitted to support issue advocacy or "soft money" party activity 
without restraint.  Public funding is available but only primarily to mainstream 
parties and candidates and only with acceptance of limiting conditions and 
stipulations. 
 
G.  "Reform" Makes a Comeback 
 
The current "reform" bills pending in Washington and many of the 
States embody the same kind of limits-based approach that has failed time and 
again in the past.  "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it."45 
 
Two particular features of many of these bills require analysis: the 
unprecedented controls on issue advocacy and soft money.   
 
H.  Issue Advocacy 
 
The bills' unprecedented regulations of issue advocacy are flatly 
unconstitutional under settled First Amendment rules.  And no amount of 
pejorative references to "phony" issue ads or "so-called" issue ads or "sham" 
issue ads can avoid that fact.   
                                                 
45George Santayana, The Life of Reason; Vol I, Reason in Common Sense, quoted in 
BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS , p. 703 (1982). This year's version of McCain-
Feingold is S. 26, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999.  See supra note 7.  
The Shays-Meehan parallel bill in the House is  H.R. 2183.  
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The Court fashioned the express advocacy doctrine to safeguard issue 
advocacy from campaign finance controls, even though such  advocacy might 
influence the outcome of an election.  The doctrine provides a bright-line, 
objective test that protects political speech by focusing solely on the content of 
the speaker's words, not the motive in the speaker's mind or the impact on the 
speaker's audience, or the proximity to an election, or the phase of the moon.  
The doctrine protects issue discussion and advocacy by allowing citizens to 
criticize the performance of elected officials at the time that such commentary is 
most vital in a democracy: during an election season.  It may be inconvenient 
for incumbent politicians when groups of citizens spend money to inform the 
voters about a politician's public stands on controversial issues like term limits, 
but it is of the essence of free speech and democracy.   
 
The McCain-Feingold bill and the Shays-Meehan bill both abandon the 
clear and narrow test of express advocacy in favor of an impermissibly 
expanded definition of that critical term in an unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad fashion. 
 
* They impose, in effect, a two-month, 60-day blackout before any 
federal election for any radio or television advertisement on any issue if that 
communication is one that in any way "refers to" any federal candidate.46   
Incumbents love that one.  Indeed, such proposals have spawned a public 
policy phrase, to "deep sixty" a bill, namely, to introduce it within sixty days of 
an election, thereby disabling and silencing any legislative advocacy groups 
from commenting on a legislator's views or actions on that bill.    
 
* The bills would restrain any communication "expressing unmistakable 
and unambiguous support for or opposition to" any federal candidate.47  If that 
had been the law in New York City, for example, and the New York Civil 
Liberties Union had run an ad during the fall campaign criticizing candidate 
Mayor Giuliani's handling of police brutality issues, that would have been 
illegal.  Police brutality issues have become pervasive in New York City this 
year.  If McCain-Feingold type laws were in effect, all organized public 
commentary on Mayor Giuliani's police brutality policies would become 
ensnared in the web of the Federal Election Campaign Act.  So too would an 
ad run last fall criticizing former Senator D'Amato's stand on abortion and 
praising his Democratic opponent, Congressman, now Senator Charles 
Schumer.  Indeed, there were many ads during that election claiming that, 
despite his rhetoric, Senator D'Amato was actively anti-choice.  Under the 
                                                 
46 S. 26, 106th Cong. Section 201(3) (1999). 
47Id. at  Section 211. 
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proposed legislation, such communications informing the public about vital 
issues of the day would be run through the meat grinder of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act.   
 
Indeed, that is the basic purpose of bills like McCain-Feingold, namely, 
to take issue and party speech which is currently beyond the pale of regulation 
and bring it within the command and control system of the Act.  The clear 
purpose and inevitable effect of such unprecedented restrictions on issue 
advocacy will be to dampen citizen criticism of incumbent officeholders standing 
for re-election at the very time when the public's attention is especially focused 
on such issues.   
 
These bills are in clear violation of First Amendment principles.  Such 
bills would impose unprecedented federal government controls on critical 
speech about incumbent politicians at the very time when such commentary is 
most vital in a democracy: during an election season.  The bill would stifle such 
speech by a radical expansion of the Supreme Court's constitutional definition 
of what political speech can be subject to campaign finance controls, namely, 
only speech which "expressly advocates" the election or defeat of political 
candidates.  The result would be to bring under federal election controls all of 
the individuals and organizations whose speech has been constitutionally 
immune, i.e. "free," from any restraint up to now.  It would treat such groups as 
though they were a PAC or partisan organization, and would subject them to all 
of the restraints applicable to campaign organizations. 
 
These proposals embody the kind of unprecedented restraint on issue 
advocacy that violates bedrock First Amendment principles, set forth with great 
clarity in Buckley and reaffirmed by numerous Supreme Court and lower court 
rulings ever since.  Indeed, one of the enduring legacies of the Buckley 
decision is its reaffirmation and strengthening of the indispensable First 
Amendment principle that public discussion of public issues is at the very core 
of the freedom of speech and of the press.  
 
First, "issue advocacy" is at the core of democracy.  In rejecting the 
claim that issue-oriented speech about incumbent politicians could be 
regulated because it might influence public opinion and affect the outcome of 
elections, the Buckley Court reminded us of the critical relationship between 
unfettered issue advocacy and healthy democracy:  "Discussion of public 
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the 
operation of the system of government established by our Constitution."48 
 
                                                 
48 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
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Second, in an election season, citizens and groups cannot effectively 
discuss issues if they are barred from discussing candidates who take stands 
on those issues. 
 
For the distinction between discussion of 
issues and candidates and advocacy of 
election or defeat of candidates may often 
dissolve in practical application.  Candidates, 
especially incumbents, are intimately tied to 
public issues involving legislative proposals 
and governmental actions.  Not only do 
candidates campaign on the basis of their 
positions on various public issues, but 
campaigns themselves generate issues of 
public interest.49 
 
If any reference to a candidate in the context of advocacy on an issue 
rendered the speaker or the speech subject to campaign finance controls, the 
consequences for First Amendment rights would be intolerable. 
 
Third, to guard against that stifling censorial overbreadth, the Court 
fashioned the critical "express advocacy" doctrine, which holds that only 
express advocacy of electoral outcomes may be subject to any form of 
restraint.  Thus, only "communications that in express terms advocate the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate"50 can be subject to any 
campaign finance controls.   
 
Finally, and most importantly, all speech which does not in express 
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate is totally 
immune from any regulation;  "So long as persons and groups eschew 
expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote 
the candidate and his views."51 
                                                 
49Id. at  42.   
50Id. at 44. 
51Id. at 45 (emphasis added).  For almost 25 years, the Federal Election Commission 
has repeatedly attempted, in one way or another, to expand the concept of express 
advocacy well beyond what the courts have permitted.  And the courts have 
consistently rebuffed the Commission in cases ranging from Federal Election Comm’n. 
v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(enbanc) to Right to Life of Dutchess County v. Federal Election Committee, 6 F. 
Supp. 2d. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) Indeed, as is well known, in one case the Fourth 
Circuit even awarded costs and attorneys fees to an organization harassed by the 
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Nor does it matter whether the issue advocacy is communicated on 
radio or television, in newspapers or magazines, through direct mail or printed 
pamphlets.  What counts for constitutional purposes is not the medium, but the 
message.  By the same token, it is constitutionally irrelevant whether the 
message costs $100 or $1,000 or $100,000.  It is content, not amount, that 
marks the constitutional boundary of allowable regulation and frees issue 
advocacy from any impermissible restraint.  The control of issue advocacy is 
simply beyond the pale of legislative authority.52 
 
This unprecedented provision is an impermissible effort to regulate 
issue speech which contains not a whisper of express advocacy, simply 
because it "refers to" a federal candidate - who is more often than not a 
Congressional incumbent - during an election season.  The First Amendment 
disables Congress from enacting such a measure regardless of whether the 
provision includes a monetary threshold, covers only broadcast media, applies 
only to speech during an election season and employs prohibition or disclosure 
as its primary regulatory device.   
 
Such proposals would cast a pall over grass-roots lobbying and 
advocacy communication by non-partisan issue-oriented groups.  It would do 
so by imposing burdensome, destructive and unprecedented disclosure and 
organizational requirements, and barring use of any organizational funding for 
such communications if any corporations or unions made any donations to the 
organization.  Such proposals would force such groups to choose between 
abandoning their issue advocacy or dramatically changing their organizational 
structure and sacrificing their speech and associational rights.   
Other severe problems with such bills are the new "coordination" rules, 
rules which will interfere with the ability of issue organizations to communicate 
with elected officials on such issues and later communicate to the public in any 
manner on such on issues.  And the greatly-expanded activities encompassed 
within the new category of "express advocacy" would be subject to those 
greatly-expanded coordination restrictions as well.  This would be a double 
deterrent to public discussion: More would be encompassed within the 
definition of express advocacy and more discussion with respect to that 
                                                                                                                         
Commission for what was clearly and purely issue speech.   Federal Election 
Comm’n. v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir 1997). 
52As the Court said a decade before Buckley in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 
(1966): "No test of reasonableness can save a state statute from invalidation as a 
violation of the First Amendment if that law makes it a crime for a newspaper editor to 
do no more than urge people to vote one way or another in a publicly held election."  
Id. 
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expanded universe of express advocacy would be ensnared under the 
coordination rules.  In effect, any person or group who talked with a 
representative about an issue would be subject to the coordination rules and 
restraints if they publicly commented on the representative's stance on those 
same issues.  And coordinated activity becomes highly controlled activity.  
Rules like this could even make tax lawyers jealous.   
 
The net result will be to make it virtually impossible for any issue 
organization to communicate, directly or indirectly, with any politician on any 
issue and then communicate on that same issue to the public.   
 
All of this will have an exceptionally chilling effect on organized issue 
advocacy in America by the hundreds and thousands of groups that 
enormously enrich political debate.  These bills fly in the face of well-settled 
Supreme Court doctrine which is designed to keep campaign finance 
regulations from ensnaring and overwhelming all political and public speech.  
And they will chill issue discussion of the actions of incumbent officeholders 
standing for re-election at the very time when it is most vital in a democracy: 
during an election season.  It may be inconvenient and annoying for incumbent 
politicians when groups of citizens spend money to inform the voters about a 
politician's public stands on controversial issues, like abortion, but it is the 
essence of free speech and democracy.     
 
I.  Soft Money 
 
The bill would also impose new controls on "soft money" funding of 
political parties, thus leaving them far less able to use their resources to 
communicate their message to the voters.  Elections are a time when we need 
more political party speech and activity, not less. "[i]t can hardly be doubted 
that the Constitutional guarantee [the First Amendment] has its fullest and most 
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."53 
 
Likewise, the unprecedented and sweeping restraints on "soft money" 
funding of issue advocacy and political activity and even a new concept called 
"federal election activity" by political parties and non-partisan groups alike also 
raise severe First Amendment concerns.54  These activities go beyond express 
advocacy, and beyond even issue advocacy referring to candidate.  The 
Orwellian concept of  regulatable "federal election activity" basically includes 
things like get-out-the-vote drives and other electoral activities on the theory 
that the conduct of such praiseworthy democratic activity may somehow be 
                                                 
53Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). 
54 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999, S. 26, 106th Cong. § 101(B)(2) (1999). 
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politically motivated or partisan.  Will licensing of all "federal election activity" be 
next?  Or with proposals like this, is it, in fact, already here. 
 
The same principles that protect unrestrained advocacy by issue 
groups safeguard issue advocacy and activity by political parties and other 
organizations.  "Soft money" is funding that does not support "express 
advocacy" of the election or defeat of federal candidates, even though it may 
exert an influence on the outcome of federal elections in the broadest sense of 
that term.  As such, it is presumptively protected against government 
regulation.  It supports political activity by parties and non-partisan 
organizations such as voter registration, voter education and get-out-the-vote 
drives.  Because such funding is not used for express advocacy, it can be 
raised from sources that would be restricted in making federal contributions or 
expenditures.55 
 
To be sure, to the extent that soft money funds issue advocacy and 
political activities by political parties, it becomes something of a hybrid: it 
supports protected and unregulatable issue speech, and activities, but by party 
organizations often closely tied to candidates and officeholders. But the kind of 
sweeping controls on the amount and source of soft money contributions to 
political parties and disclosure of soft money disbursements by other 
organizations raise severe constitutional problems.  Disclosure, rather than 
limitation, of large soft money contributions to political parties, but not to other 
organizations, is the more appropriate and less restrictive alternative.56 
 
The proposed legislative labyrinth of restrictions on party funding and 
political activity can have no other effect but to deter and discourage precisely 
the kind of political party activity that the First Amendment was designed to 
protect.  
 
J.  A Better Proposal for Reform 
                                                 
55 Richard Briffault, Article: Campaign Finance, The Parties and the Court: A Comment 
on Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election 
Commission, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY  91 (1997); Bradley Smith, The Current Debate 
Over Soft Money: Soft Money, Hard Realities, The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft 
Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179 (1998). 
56Many of the key Federal Election Commission restraints on the use of soft money for 
issue advocacy are being challenged in a case currently pending in the District of 
Columbia Circuit brought by the Republican National Committee and the Ohio 
Democratic Party as co-plaintiffs. See Republican National Committee v. FEC, 1998 
U.S. App. Lexis 38361 (1998) (denying a preliminary injunction against FEC 
regulations). 
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We are at a constitutional crossroads on campaign finance reform.  
Read The New York Times' latest editorial and be left with the sense that if the 
Congress does not pass the McCain-Feingold bill by sundown, democracy, not 
to mention the Constitution, will be lost forever.  Unless the federal government 
enacts such measures to clamp down immediately on unregulated "soft money" 
and "issue advocacy" and unregistered "federal election activity" and improper 
"coordination" between citizens and their elected representatives, the Republic 
is surely doomed.  The academic and editorial outcry of support for such an 
overly broad piece of legislation is almost deafening.   
 
Although McCain-Feingold is unlikely to be passed - let alone be before 
the Court - anytime soon, a surrogate for all the command and control 
mechanisms of that flawed piece of legislation will be before the Court in the 
Missouri contribution limits case.57  The forces of "reform" who brought us the 
Federal Election Campaign Act will use that case to insist that low and 
restrictive contribution limits must be maintained as the only democratic line of 
defense against "corruption" and "undue influence" and the "buying of 
elections."  Should the Court agree and sustain extremely low legislatively-
compelled contribution limits, that judicial mandate will be used by "reform" 
forces as the doctrinal pivot to justify attempts to close every "loophole" in 
campaign finance controls that can be "plugged" by reference to the reaffirmed 
authority to limit campaign contributions.  That is precisely the theory to justify 
McCain-Feingold's extraordinary expansion of the range of campaign finance 
controls by making virtually all political party funding and most issue advocacy 
funding and some "federal election activity" funding subject to the regime of the 
FECA, particularly its core restraints on the source and size of political 
contributions. 
 
For 25 years, those of us associated with the ACLU have urged a 
different approach to the campaign finance dilemma, a triad approach based 
on three essential principles. 
 
First, raise or even repeal all limits on campaign contributions or 
expenditures.  They offend the principles of the First Amendment, they distort 
First Amendment doctrine, and they simply don't work.  Increasingly, there is a 
growing amount of editorial and political support for at least raising contribution 
ceilings to the level of inflation, so that the federal ceiling would be $3,000, not 
$1,000.58  Except for those extremists who would wish for all political activity to 
                                                 
57See Shrink Missouri PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert granted, 119 
S. Ct. 901 (1999). 
58Stirrings on Campaign Finance, WASH. POST , March 19, 1999, A28; Time to Reform 
Campaign Reforms, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, March 7, 1999, at p.20; Paul Merrion, Biz 
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be publicly funded only, with no right of private contribution or expenditure, no 
one can justify on policy grounds the retention of the $1,000 limit for federal 
campaigns.  
 
Second, insure timely - indeed, instantaneous - and effective disclosure 
of large contributions to major political parties and committees, so that the 
public has immediate access to this information.  And make sure that these 
disclosures come out before the election and are widely publicized by the 
media and watchdog groups like Common Cause so that we will know before 
the election about the fund-raising activities of candidates and their parties.  
That is the most appropriate and democratic remedy to deal with the concerns 
over undue access and influence by contributors on elected officials.  Let the 
people decide who's too cozy with the fat cats and the so-called "special 
interests."  Let the people know about the "China connection" to Presidential 
fundraising before the election, not after.  Let the public know that the 
President, who agreed only to use public funding for his political campaign in 
1996, raised funds for and drafted the copy of Democratic Party campaign 
advertisements in 1995 that guaranteed his re-election before the official 
campaign even began.   
 
Third, provide a meaningful and broad-scale package of serious public 
funding and benefits for all qualified political candidates.  This is a strategy to 
provide floors to support and expand political opportunity, not ceilings to 
restrict political activity.  That would be a real investment in democracy. 
 
The most effective and least constitutionally problematic route to 
genuine campaign finance reform is a system of equitable and adequate public 
financing. But proposals for public financing need to avoid certain pitfalls. First, 
they should not compel candidates and parties to limit their political speech in 
order to have that speech subsidized by government.  Instead, the principle 
should be one of building floors to support political speech, not ceilings to 
restrict it.  Second, public financing schemes should avoid mechanisms 
whereby benefits and subsidies to one candidate are triggered by the 
campaign funding and campaign speech activities of other candidates and 
even independent groups.  Such contingent funding arrangements can confer 
too much power on government to determine what campaign activities or 
speech entitles other candidates to increased funds or fund-raising 
opportunities.  Third, public financing arrangements should be as inclusive as 
possible, so that new political voices are enabled, rather than stifled.  Finally, 
                                                                                                                         
Backs Bid to Curb Soft Money: A New Corporate-Led Bid for Campaign Reform, 
CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS, April 5, 1999, p.3; Even legislative proposals that would 
ban soft money entirely, would at least raise the hard money limits on contributions to 
parties to make up the shortfall. 
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public financing should take a mix of different forms so that candidates and 
parties are not dependent on one single governmental funding source.   
 
If a serious public funding program were coupled with an easing of fund 
raising restrictions on those candidates who do not opt into the public funding 
system, the combination might give candidates a real choice about the best 
way to get their messages out and the voters a real choice about which 
candidates they prefer.   
 
Here are some of the components of such a campaign finance benefits 
package.   
 
* Give modest tax credits of up to $100 or even $500 for private political 
contributions to any political party or candidate - Democratic, Republican or 
Socialist.  Now that would be the most straightforward and democratic form of 
public financing of politics -- through private choices, publicly amplified.  If 50 
million voters gave $100 each, you could fund all of federal politics in a year to 
the tune of about $5,000,000,000 without a penny going through government 
hands.  Now that's a good use of the coming federal budget surplus.   
 
* Give free franked mail privileges to all qualified political candidates, 
not just Democrats and Republicans, at least during the general election.  
Incumbents get it free for most of their terms in office, why not let challengers 
have the same perk during the election season.59  It would facilitate political 
communication and reduce the dependence on private funding.  That's a 
serious way to help level the playing field between incumbents and challengers. 
 
* Make serious amounts of public funding or matching funds available 
to all federal candidates.60 
                                                 
59In this regard, the Court’s decision allowing broad government regulation of political 
party choices regarding the “fusion” tickets was a disappointment.  See Timmons v. 
Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).  So too was the Court’s decision 
allowing public broadcasting stations broad discretion to exclude a “non-serious” 
Congressional candidate from publicly-sponsored televised candidate debates.  See 
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes 523 U.S. 666 (1998); see 
generally, Joel Gora, Forbes, Finley and Free Speech: Does He Who Pays the Piper 
Always Get to Call the Tune, 15 TOURO L. REV 965 (1999). 
60Jonathan Rauch, How to Repair America’s Campaign Finance System, Part I:  Give 
Polls Free Money, No Rules, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT , Dec. 29, 1997/Jan. 5, 
1998, p.54-56.  Concluding that our current system of campaign finance is a disaster, 
one journalist, Jonathan Rauch, proposed in U.S. News and World Report that 
Congressional candidates be given a real choice between total and extremely 
generous public funding - perhaps $500,000 for Congressional candidates, with tough 
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* Although posing severe, and perhaps insurmountable, constitutional 
difficulties, afford candidates free air time, with no restrictions or conditions, to 
get their message across to the voters.61 
 
All of these approaches would have the collateral benefit of allowing 
candidates to spend less time raising money and more time raising issues. 
 
And these strategies have one other thing in common: they expand 
political opportunity without limiting political speech.  They say that if there is to 
be any leveling principle in the First Amendment, it should be one of level up, 
not level down.  More speech, not silence coerced by law.  Time has shown the 
wisdom of that approach and the folly of an approach based on limits.  That 
should not be surprising because the enduring wisdom of the "more speech" 
solution is nothing less than the enduring wisdom and very essence of the First 
Amendment itself: 
 
"Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances." 
                                                                                                                         
restrictions on private contributions, or forgoing public funding with no restrictions on 
contributions or expenditures.  Implausible? Naive? Crazy? Any more than our current 
campaign finance system? 
61For a strong argument against the constitutionality of requiring broadcasters to 
provide free time for politicians, see LILLIAN BEVIER,  IS FREE TV FOR FEDERAL 
CANDIDATES CONSTITUTIONAL? (1999); see also, Joel Gora, Five Fatal Flaws with 
Proposals for Free TV, Talk presented at American Enterprise Institute, February 
1999. 
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